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Abstract
This paper examines the influence of large creditors in determining the likelihood of debt
defaults due to creditor coordination failure. We develop a model in which a large creditor
and a group of small creditors independently decide, based on private signals of
fundamentals, whether to foreclose on a loan. In the absence of common knowledge of
fundamentals, the incidence of failure is uniquely determined. Comparative statics on the
unique equilibrium provides simple characterization of the role of large creditors. Our results
show that the smaller the large creditor is, the more vulnerable the debtor is to premature
foreclosure. We also find that information of relatively high precision available to the large
creditor reduces the probability of failure.
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Conventional wisdom says that large creditors can exert a disproportionate amount of
inﬂuence in determining the likelihood of debt defaults due to coordination failure. Even
if fundamentals are sound, apprehension of premature foreclosure by a single large creditor
may induce preemptive actions by other creditors, and the consequent liquidation of the
distressed debtor’s assets can give rise to self-fulﬁlling debt defaults.
Our goal in this paper is to examine the inﬂuence of large creditors in such a strategic
situation formally. In focusing on the role a large creditor plays in a creditor coordination
game, we employ the equilibrium selection framework based on the global games literature.
Global games, pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , are games with incomplete
information whose type space is determined by the players each observing a private noisy
signal of the underlying state.1 Morris and Shin (1999) applied this framework to a creditor
coordination problem, and provided a set of conditions for uniqueness in equilibrium and
several comparative statics results concerning coordination risk of debt.
This paper extends the analysis of Morris and Shin (1999) by introducing a large creditor.
We oﬀer a model in which a large creditor and a continuum of small creditors independently
decide, based on private signals of fundamentals, whether to foreclose on a loan.2 In the
absence of common knowledge of fundamentals, the incidence of failure is uniquely deter-
mined. Comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides simple characterization of
the role of large creditors. Our results show that the smaller the large creditor is, the more
vulnerable the debtor is to premature foreclosure. We also ﬁnd that information of relatively
high precision available to the large creditor reduces the probability of failure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set up a creditor
coordination game with one large and many small creditors. In Section 3, we derive the
unique equilibrium. In Section 4, we characterize the comparative statics properties of the
equilibrium in terms of the large creditor’s size and the precision of information available
to the large creditor. Section 5 contains the conclusion. All proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2. The model
The general structure of the model is as follows. Time is divided into three periods, t =0 ,
1, and 2. A ﬁrm has a project maturing at period 2 to yield a return v, which is uncertain
at period 0. The project is debt-ﬁnanced by a continuum of ex-ante identical small creditors
and a large creditor. Each small creditor has an inﬁnitesimal portion of the whole stake. The
proportion of loans ﬁnanced by the large creditor is λ ∈ [0,1]. The combined mass of loans
ﬁnanced by small creditors then amounts to 1 − λ. The face value of repayment is L>0.
Each creditor can receive the face value at period 2 if the realized value of v is large enough
1For global games, see the excellent survey by Morris and Shin (2002) .
2Asymmetric global games with a large player and a continuum ofsmall players have been studied in
the context ofcurrency attacks, by Corsetti et al. (2001) , Corsetti et al. (2002) , Metz (2002) , and Takeda
(2000) . We do not know ofany attempts to apply the f ramework to creditor coordination problems other
than ours.
1to cover repayment of debt. We assume that every creditor is rational and each creditor
knows that the others are rational as well.
At period 1, each creditor has the chance to decide whether to continue lending until
the project matures, or to stop lending and seize the collateral K∗ ∈ (0,L). If the collateral
is liquidated following the project’s failure, it has a lower liquidation value K∗ ∈ [0,K∗).
The value of the project at maturity depends on two factors: the randomly-determined
underlying fundamental state θ ∈ R, which has a uniform prior distribution,3 and a severity
of disruption z>0 caused to the project in the event of early liquidation by creditors.
Denoting by   the proportion of creditors who stop lending at period 1, if θ is larger than z ,
the ﬁrm remains in operation. Otherwise, the ﬁrm is forced into bankruptcy. The realized
value of the project is given by
v (θ, )=

V if z  < θ,
K∗ if z  ≥ θ,
where V is a constant greater than L.
By normalizing the payoﬀs such that L = 1 and K∗ = 0, the payoﬀs to a creditor are
given by the following matrix, where κ ≡ (K∗ − K∗)/(L − K∗):
Project succeeds (if z  < θ) Project fails (if z  ≥ θ)
Continue lending 1 0
Stop lending κ κ
.
For simplicity, we assume that if continued lending yields the same expected payoﬀ as stopped
lending, then a creditor prefers to stop.
Although the creditors do not observe the realization of θ until period 2, they receive
private signals regarding it. The large creditor receives the noisy signal
y = θ + τη, (1)
where τ>0 is a scale factor and η is a random variable with mean 0, and with smooth
symmetric density g(·). Let G(·) be the cumulative density function for g(·). Similarly, a
typical small creditor i receives the signal
xi = θ + σεi, (2)
where σ>0 is a scale factor and εi is an idiosyncratic random variable with mean 0, and
with smooth symmetric density f(·) and cumulative density F(·). εi is i.i.d. across creditors
and each is independent of η. Upon receiving its respective signal, a creditor infers the value
of θ and the density of signals received by the other creditors, as well as their estimates of θ.
Likewise, all other creditors form their beliefs while relying on their own private information.
3As Morris and Shin (2002) point out, uniform priors are well behaved, as far as we are concerned only
with conditional beliefs, and can be thought of as the limiting case where the information in the prior density
becomes diﬀuse. This assumption enables us to concentrate on the posterior beliefs of creditors conditional
on their signals and to simplify the derivation of the equilibrium.
2This assumption of incomplete information is the key to deriving the unique equilibrium.
The timing of the events is as follows:
Period 0. The ﬁrm invests its debt-ﬁnanced fund into the project.
Nature chooses θ.
Period 1. Private signals regarding θ are observed by the creditors.
The creditors decide whether to continue lending or to stop lending.
Creditors who choose to stop lending receive κ.
Period 2. The project matures and yields a return v.
Creditors who have chosen to continue lending receive 1 or 0, depending on the
realization of v.
3. The equilibrium
Before searching for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game under the incomplete
information described above, we shall brieﬂy discuss the coordination problem under com-
plete information. Suppose that the creditors perfectly know the value of θ before deciding
whether to continue lending. In this case, we can describe their optimal strategies as follows:
If θ>z , then to continue lending is optimal, regardless of what the other creditors do, since
the project will succeed even if all the other creditors stop lending. On the contrary, if θ ≤ 0,
then to stop lending is optimal regardless of what the other creditors do, because the project
will fail even if all the other creditors continue lending.
If θ ∈ (0,z], then there is a coordination problem among the creditors. Each creditor
assumes that if all the other creditors continue lending, then the payoﬀ for continued lending
is 1, so that continued lending yields more than the early liquidation value κ. On the other
hand, it assumes that if they stop lending, the payoﬀ for continued lending is 0 <κ , so that
early liquidation is optimal. Thus, under complete information, there are two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria: to continue lending and to stop lending.4
We now show that under incomplete information there is a unique dominance-solvable
equilibrium in which both types of creditors follow their respective switching strategies
around the critical signals x∗ and y∗. To derive the unique equilibrium, we ﬁrst direct
our attention to solving for switching strategies around the critical signals, and then proceed
to show how this solution can be obtained by the iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies.
First, we consider the critical value of the fundamentals θ, above which continued lending
by the small creditors alone is suﬃcient for the project to succeed. θ is given by
θ = z







4This type of coordination problem among creditors is analogous to the self-fulﬁlling bank run problem
suggested by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , and entails multiple equilibria in the complete information game
where θ is common knowledge.
3We then consider the critical value of the fundamentals θ, above which the project succeeds
if, and only if, both large and small creditors continue lending:
θ = z







Since both θ and θ are functions of the small creditors’ switching point x∗, which depends
on the large creditor’s switching point y∗, we need to solve these two switching points simul-
taneously from the respective optimization problems of the creditors. First, we consider the
large creditor’s problem. Given θ, its optimal strategy is to continue lending if, and only if,
its expected payoﬀ for continued lending conditional on y, which is given by G((y − θ)/τ),








Next, we consider a small creditor’s problem. If θ>θ, continued lending can be successful
regardless of the large creditor’s actions. If θ ∈ (θ,θ], the project succeeds if, and only if,
the large creditor continues lending. If θ ≤ θ, the project fails even if the large creditor
continues lending. Since a small creditor’s optimal strategy is to continue lending if, and
only if, its expected payoﬀ for continued lending conditional on x exceeding its payoﬀ for

























dθ = κ. (6)
























f (s)ds − κ =0 . (8)











4Given that the left-hand side of (8) is strictly decreasing in both δ and δ, it is strictly
increasing in x∗. The left-hand side of (8) is negative for suﬃciently small x∗, and positive
for suﬃciently large x∗. Given that the left-hand side of (8) is continuous in x∗, there is a
unique solution to (8). Once x∗ is established, y∗ can be determined from (5).
Thus far, we have shown that there is a unique equilibrium within switching strategies.
We can ﬁnish the argument by showing that the switching equilibrium identiﬁed above is the
only equilibrium strategy to survive the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. Now we have:
Proposition 1 There is a unique, dominance-solvable equilibrium in which the large creditor
uses the switching strategy around y∗ and the small creditors use the switching strategy around
x∗.5
Proposition 1 corresponds to Lemma 1 of Morris and Shin (1999) , which shows the
existence of the unique switching-strategy equilibrium in a coordination game among ex-
ante identical small creditors.
4. The role of the large creditor
Having established the uniqueness of equilibrium, we can now examine the role of the
large creditor. In contrast to the model with only small creditors discussed in Morris and
Shin (1999) , the model with both small and large creditors cannot be solved explicitly for
the equilibrium. The four equations (3), (4), (5), and (8) jointly determine the critical states
θ and θ and the switching points x∗ and y∗. Although it is diﬃcult to acquire deﬁnitive
comparative statics results for general parameter values, we can obtain tidy results by fo-
cusing on the limiting case where creditors have very precise information. In such a case,
fundamental uncertainty of the payoﬀ relevant state θ becomes smaller and smaller, while
strategic uncertainty of the action of others remains as large as ever, so that we can highlight
the strategic impact of the large creditor.
Let us explore the limiting case where both types of creditors have arbitrarily precise
information, while the precision of the large creditor’s signal relative to the small creditors’
tends to r: σ → 0, τ → 0, and σ/τ → r.
In the limit, it follows from (5) that as τ → 0, y∗ must converge to θ, otherwise the
left-hand side of (5) converges to either zero or one, rather than κ. Therefore, in the limit,
the large creditor continues lending at states better than θ, and stops lending at states equal
to or worse than θ. From (3) and (4), as σ → 0 the same argument holds for the small
creditors, so that they also follow the switching strategy around θ as well. Consequently, in
the limit we have x∗ = y∗ = θ, so that the project succeeds if, and only if, θ>θ . In other
words, the switching points for both types of creditors converge to the critical state θ,a t
which the project switches from failure to success in the limit.
As Corsetti et al. (2001) point out in their currency crisis model, in solving for the critical
state in the limit, it is essential to distinguish the case where the large player is suﬃciently
5The general structure ofour model conf orms to a class ofsupermodular games in which the iterative
elimination ofstrictly dominated strategies yields a unique equilibrium as the uniquely rationalizable strategy.
See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for rationalizable strategies in the class of supermodular games.
5large from the case where it is not. We know from (3) and (4) that it is only when θ <z λ
that θ is larger than θ, while θ = θ holds when θ ≥ zλ. We can characterize the equilibrium
value of θ in the limit as follows:
Proposition 2 In the limit as σ → 0, τ → 0, and σ/τ → r, the critical state θ converges to






r(s − δ) − G
−1(κ)
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ds = κ. (9)





















Proof. See the appendix.
4.1 Size of the large creditor
Now let us consider how a change in the size of the large creditor aﬀects the probability
of failure.
Proposition 3 In the limit as σ → 0, τ → 0, and σ/τ → r, the critical state θ is strictly
decreasing in λ.
Proof. See the appendix.
In other words, a decrease in the size of the large creditor reduces the range of funda-
mentals where creditors continue lending and raises the probability of project failure.
In their currency crisis model, Corsetti et al. (2001) reveal that the existence of a large
trader always has a non-negative eﬀect on the incidence of attack on the currency in the
limit where traders have very precise information. They do not, however, provide a deﬁnitive
conclusion on the size eﬀect of the large trader.6 In contrast, our model shows that within
the class of asymmetric global games with a large player, a case exists where we can unam-
biguously identify the global sign of the eﬀect of the large player’s size on the equilibrium,
regardless of the large player’s size itself.
6To be more precise, they suggest that it is only when the size ofthe large trader is suﬃciently large that
the size eﬀect has an unambiguously positive eﬀect on the incidence ofattack on the currency in the limiting
case. When the size is small, the size eﬀect is ambiguous in their model.
64.2 Relative precision of information available to the large creditor
Next, we consider how a change in the precision of the large creditor’s signal relative to
the small creditors’ signals inﬂuences the probability of failure.
Proposition 4 In the limit as σ → 0, τ → 0, and σ/τ → r, the critical state θ is strictly
decreasing in r.7
Proof. See the appendix.
In other words, a decrease in the precision of the large creditor’s signal relative to the
small creditors’ reduces the range of fundamentals where creditors continue lending and
raises the probability of project failure.
Our results show that increasing the size of the large creditor, as well as increasing the
relative precision of information available to it, increases the likelihood of project success,
which is at the Pareto superior equilibrium in our model. On the contrary, Corsetti et al.
(2001) argue that when the large trader is suﬃciently large, increasing the size of it, as well
as increasing the relative precision available to it, increases the likelihood of peg failure,
which is at the Pareto inferior equilibrium in their currency crisis model. The contrastive
results come from the diﬀerence in the payoﬀ structure between the two models. The large
creditor in our model receives the better payoﬀ when the project succeeds, whereas the large
trader in their model receives the better payoﬀ when the peg fails. If we construct a creditor
coordination game where a large creditor can make a proﬁt from a debtor’s bankruptcy, the
comparative statics will likely provide quite diﬀerent results from those in this paper.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied a coordination game played by a large creditor and a
continuum of small creditors, and examined the inﬂuence of the large creditor on the equi-
librium. In the absence of common knowledge of fundamentals, the incidence of failure
is uniquely determined. Results from comparative statics on the unique equilibrium show
that increasing the size of the large creditor, as well as increasing the relative precision of
information available to the large creditor, reduces the range of fundamentals where cred-
itors stop lending, and tends to prevent project failure. These ﬁndings imply that, under
circumstances where self-fulﬁlling beliefs as well as fundamentals play an important role in
determining outcomes, a solvent but illiquid debtor who would be forced into bankruptcy
by the creditors’ disruptive early liquidation without a large creditor, may well be expected
to be saved by successful creditor coordination with a large, well-informed creditor.
7In a symmetric global game ` al aMorris and Shin (1999) , the equilibrium in the limit does not depend
on the structure ofthe noise. Proposition 4 implies that noise-independent equilibrium selection f ails in our
model with payoﬀ asymmetry among creditors. See Frankel et al. (2003) for noise-independent equilibrium
selection. Furthermore, in the symmetric global game, the equilibrium in the limit is a robust equilibrium to
incomplete information. Proposition 4 implies that there is no robust equilibrium to incomplete information
in our asymmetric global game with a large creditor. See Kajii and Morris (1997) for robustness to incomplete
information.
7Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We complete the proof for proposition 1 by showing that the switching strategy is the only
equilibrium strategy that survives iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Let
us consider a small creditor’s best response conditional on x when all other small creditors
follow the switching strategy around 	 x and the large creditor plays its best response against
this switching strategy, which we know is the switching strategy around y(	 x), by using (5).
The net expected payoﬀ for a small creditor from continued lending as opposed to stopped






























where θ(	 x) and θ(	 x) denote the values of θ and θ when small creditors follow the switching
strategy around 	 x. Note that π(·,·) is strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument and strictly
decreasing in its second.
For suﬃciently good signals, the net expected payoﬀ for a small creditor from contin-
ued lending is positive, and continued lending is a dominant strategy for a small creditor,
regardless of what the other creditors do. Let x1 be the threshold value of x, above which
continued lending is a dominant strategy for a small creditor. Since every creditor is rational,
it does not use a dominated strategy. Furthermore, since each creditor knows that the others
are rational, it infers that the others will not use a dominated strategy either. Thus, for a
small creditor to stop lending above x1 cannot be a dominant strategy. As a consequence,
to stop lending cannot be a dominant strategy for a small creditor whenever its signal is
above x2 such that it solves π(x2,x1) = 0. Since the switching strategy around x2 is the
best response to the switching strategy around x1, even the small creditor who assumes the
lowest possibility of the project’s success believes that the incidence of continued lending is
higher than that implied by the switching strategy around x1 and the large creditor’s best
response y(x1). Since π(·,·) is strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument, any strategy to stop
lending for signals higher than x2 is strictly dominated. Proceeding in this way, we have the
following decreasing sequence:
x1 > x2 > x3 > ... > xk > ...,
where any strategy to stop lending for signal x>xk does not survive k steps of elimination
of strictly dominated strategies. Common knowledge of rationality takes this procedure to
the limit. Sequence {xk}∞
k=0 is monotone and bounded, so that the limiting point x∞ =
limk→∞ xk exists and is given by x∞ = sup(x|π(x,x) = 0). x∞ is the largest solution to
π(x,x) = 0. Any strategy to stop lending above x∞ does not survive the iterative elimination
of strictly dominated strategies.
A similar argument applies to the smallest solution to π(x,x) = 0, and thus there exists
8x∞ such that x∞ = inf(x|π(x,x) = 0). Any strategy that continues lending below x∞ does
not survive iterative elimination. However, if π(x,x) = 0 has a unique solution, then the
largest solution x∞ must coincide with the smallest solution x∞. Hence, there is only one
strategy that still remains after eliminating all strictly dominated strategies, implying that
this switching strategy is the unique equilibrium strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2
First, suppose that limθ <z λ , so that limθ < limθ. Since x∗ → θ,( θ − x∗)/σ →∞
must hold, and it follows that δ →∞ . Thus, (8) can be written as (9). Next, suppose
that limθ ≥ zλ, so that limθ = limθ. Since x∗ → θ, δ must be ﬁnite. We know from (3)




=1−λ−(1−λ)F (δ). Thus, δ = F −1 (F (δ)+λ/(1 − λ)) and
(8) can be written as (10). In both (9) and (10), the left-hand side is strictly increasing in δ,
so that there is a unique value of δ that solves both equations. Accordingly, the proposition
follows from (4).
Proof of Proposition 3
When θ <z λ , (9) holds. The left-hand side of (9) is strictly decreasing in λ through its eﬀect
on M, so that δ is strictly increasing in λ. When θ <z λ , (10) holds. Since the left-hand side
of (9) does not depend on λ, δ does not depend on λ either. Hence, regardless of the size of










Since δ is non-decreasing in λ, the left-hand side of (11) must be negative. Thus, θ is strictly
decreasing in λ.
Proof of Proposition 4
In both (9) and (10), the left-hand side is strictly increasing in r, while strictly decreasing
in δ. Therefore, δ must be strictly increasing in r. It follows from (4) that as δ increase, θ
must decrease. Hence, θ is strictly decreasing in r.
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